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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to conclude that there were various material 
controverted facts? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to conclude that such material controverted 
facts, if found in favor of the Appellant, could be the basis for the application of various principles 
of equity which would operate to establish that timely notice of renewal was given? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to conclude that such material controverted 
facts, if found in favor of the Appellant, could be the basis for a course of dealing which modified or 
amended the lease agreement between the parties? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's grant of summary judgment should be upheld only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Andreini v. Hultgren 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993). 
Atrial Court's decision to grant or deny a Motion for Summary Judgment is a legal 
one and will be reviewed for correctness. The Appellate court will grant no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Salt Lake City v. Silverfork Pipeline. 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant seeks to have the Summary Judgment entered by the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding, 
reversed and vacated, and to have the case remanded to the District Court for evidentiary 
proceedings. The Appellant filed its complaint in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, Utah on or about November 7, 1997. On January 23, 1998, the District Court heard oral 
argument on the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, on February 24, 1998, the 
District Court entered Summary Judgment. On March 4, 1998, the Appellant filed a Motion to Alter 
or Amend Judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, District Court 
entered an Order to Amend Judgment on March 24, 1998. The Appellant timely filed its Notice of 
Appeal on March 30, 1998, and its Docketing Statement on April 20, 1998. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about August 25, 1992, the Defendant/Appellee, Hillside Plaza, Ltd. 
("Hillside"), as landlord, and KB. Foods, Inc., as tenant, entered into a commercial lease agreement 
(the "Lease"). (Complaint, 1f4.) 
2. By virtue of a written Assignment of Lease executed on or about July 1, 1994, 
K.B. Foods, Inc. assigned all of its right, title and interest in and to the Lease to the 
Plaintifl^ Appellant, Pomodoro Partnership (Pomodoro"), which assignment of Lease was approved 
and accepted by Hillside. (Complaint,! 5.) 
3* Subject to an attachment to the Lease which is captioned "Renewal Option", 
the term of the Lease would have expired on December 31,1997. The Renewal Option provides that 
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Pomodoro may renew the term of the Lease for an additional five (5) years " . . . by delivering to 
Landlord written notice of Tenant's exercise of its option to renew the Term at least One Hundred 
Twenty (120) days prior to the original expiration date of the Term . . . ." (See Hillside Plaza Lease 
and Renewal Option attached to Hillside's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment as Exhibits "A" and "B" ) 
4. On or about April 24, 1997, Pomodoro, by and through its general partners 
Brian Morton and Wendy Caron, met with Hillside's agent, John Johnson. At this meeting, Mr. 
Morton and Ms. Caron indicated to Mr. Johnson that certain capital improvements to the leasehold 
premises (especially the installation of a new and additional air conditioner) were necessary. Mr. 
Johnson advised them that Hillside would not make the improvements and suggested that Pomodoro 
should do so. The parties discussed the term of the Lease and Pomodoro's right to renew the term. 
Mr. Morton and Ms. Caron clearly conveyed to Mr. Johnson that, if Pomodoro were to construct the 
required improvements at its cost, Pomodoro would only do so if it renewed the Lease. (Affidavit 
of Brian Morton, f2, 6, 7, 8 and 9.) 
5. Soon thereafter, Pomodoro installed, among other things, a new air conditioner 
at a cost of approximately Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00); new floors on the leasehold premises 
at a cost of approximately Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00); a new custom built service station 
on the leasehold premises at a cost of approximately One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($1,500.00); and new wood blinds on the leasehold premises at an approximate cost of Seven 
Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00). Pomodoro completed these installations prior to September 1, 1997. 
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Total cost of capital improvements to the leasehold premises by Pomodoro was approximately Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00). (Affidavit of Brian Morton If 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.) 
6. Despite Pomodoro's undertaking of substantial and expensive improvements 
to the leasehold premises, and Hillside's acceptance and approval thereof, Mr. Johnson advised 
Pomodoro by a letter dated September 3, 1997, that it had failed to renew the Lease by the required 
date, or September 2, 1997. Upon receipt of Mr. Johnson's letter, Pomodoro immediately served 
upon Hillside a written notice of its intention to renew the Lease by a letter dated September 8, 1997, 
which was delivered to Mr. Johnson. (Hillside Reply Memorandum, [^2; Affidavit of Brian Morton, 
1fl5, 16 and 18, copy of Morton letter dated September 8, 1997). 
7. The delay in the delivery of the written Notice of Renewal was only six (6) 
days. The failure to have given notice by September 2, 1997, was based upon the prior verbal 
statements to Mr. Johnson expressing Pomodoro's intention to renew the Lease; the acquiescence 
of Mr. Johnson to the capital improvements made by Pomodoro and his knowledge that such 
improvements would not have been made absent an intention to renew the Lease; and the reasonable 
belief by Pomodoro that it had complied with the renewal provisions of the Lease by giving verbal 
notice of intent to renew at the meeting between Mr. Morton, Ms. Caron and Mr. Johnson in April, 
1997. (Affidavit of Brian Morton, ^15, 17 and 19.) 
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ARGUMENT 
L SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER SINCE THERE ARE GENUINE 
ISSUES REGARDING MATERIAL FACTS. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits summary judgment when all 
pleadings in a matter demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 798 P.2d 
733 (Utah 1990); Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980). Additionally, this 
Court must "review the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party, while giving no deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions." Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight 845 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1992). 
According to Pomodoro's testimony, Pomodoro stated to Hillside's agent, Mr. 
Johnson, that Pomodoro would renew the Lease if Pomodoro proceeded with certain capital 
improvements. Further, Pomodoro submits that Mr. Johnson, as agent for Hillside, acknowledged 
Pomodoro's position; observed and monitored Pomodoro's construction and installation of the capital 
improvements; and accepted the capital improvements as a permanent part of the leased premises. 
Hillside expressly or impliedly denies the foregoing. It is apparently Hillsides' 
contention that it was unaware of any decision by Pomodoro to exercise the option to renew the 
Lease, notwithstanding the substantial improvements (approximately $50,000.00 cost) rendered to 
the leased premises by Pomodoro, and that there was no specific discussion between representatives 
of Pomodoro and Hillside wherein the parties understood that the installation of capital improvements 
by Pomodoro would effectively be the delivery of notice to Hillside of Pomodoro's intention to 
exercise its option to renew. 
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Further, Hillside points out that Pomodoro admits that it "forgot about the written 
requirement" with respect to notice of exercise until after it received Mr. Johnson's letter dated 
September 3, 1997. However, it is Pomodoro's position, with respect to which Hillside takes 
exception, that Pomodoro didn't overlook the requirement of a writing, but rather believed, 
consistent with the understanding between Pomodoro and Mr. Johnson, that a writing was 
unnecessary under these circumstances. 
If the trial court had considered the above facts (rather than have ruled in a strict 
constructionist matter as is discussed below), it would have been forced to conclude that there are 
material factual questions to be resolved in this matter and that a trial is required. To have done 
otherwise, has denied Pomodoro its opportunity to be heard on the merits of its claim. 
H. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY MUST BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH 
ANY RULING WHICH DETERMINES POMODORO'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
LEASE RENEWAL PROVISIONS. 
A. The LX.L. case can be factually distinguished and was incorrectly applied. 
In granting Hillside's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court concluded that 
the matter of I.X.L. Furniture and Carpet Installment House v. Berets. 33 Utah 454, 91 P.279 (Utah 
1907) was controlling authority. Although the trial court in this matter acknowledged that there were 
certain unresolved equitable issues, it stated that I.X.L. was "controlling precedent and it is a legal 
issue and not an equitable one." (Emphasis added) (Transcript of proceedings, pp. 4, 23 and 24) In 
other words, the trial court adopted a "strict constructionist" approach to the facts of this matter and, 
in its ruling, considered only whether Pomodoro had exercised the lease renewal privilege in the 
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manner and in the time required by the Lease. The trial court refiised (and stated that it was 
compelled to refuse) to consider any equitable facts. 
Pomodoro submits that the trial court failed to consider two (2) significant aspects 
of the I.X.L decision. First, although the facts in the I.X.L. matter had several similarities to the 
facts of this case, it is extremely significant that in the I.X.L. case the term of the subject lease had 
expired prior to the date that any notice of renewal was delivered. The I.X.L. court noted at p. 
282 that: 
The tenancy ceased on the expiration of the lease, and the right to rent 
terminated with i t . . . . Where a notice of any kind is required to obtain a 
renewal of a lease and a request is no less than a notice, the general rule 
seems to be that such notice must be given before the expiration of the old 
lease, or it will be too late . . . [T]he lessor should know the moment the 
lease expires whether he has or has not a tenant. 
The emphasis in the foregoing upon the expiration date of the lease as the last date 
to renew, is an important factual distinction. The primary term of the Hillside/Pomodoro Lease 
did not end until December 31, 1997. Hillside acknowledges that Pomodoro delivered written 
notice of an exercise of the option to renew on September 8, 1997, almost four (4) months before 
the primary term ended. 
Second, the trial court failed to consider that I.X.L. clearly requires an examination 
of the equities. At the same time as the I.X.L. opinion stressed the importance of recognizing the 
integrity of contract provisions, it stated the need, in that process, to consider equitable principles. 
"Courts have no right to disregard any provisions of a contract, or to save rights that are lost 
thereunder through the act of the party asking relief, unless it is made to appear that it would 
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be unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do or not to do so." (Emphasis added) LX.L. 
supra at page 283. Prior to ruling on Hillside's Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court 
had a duty, even pursuant to the holding ofl.X.L.. to review all of the facts which support claims 
for equitable relief. In order to grant Hillside's Motion, the trial court had a further duty to 
conclude that such facts, viewed in a light most favorable to Pomodoro, could not support a 
finding of "unconscionability" or "clear inequity". Indeed, the trial court ignored the equitable 
facts and made no findings nor reached any conclusions about the equitable issues. 
B. The I.X.L. case requires that equitable principles be reviewed in order to 
determine Pomodoro's compliance with the lease renewal provisions. 
Hillside has stated to this Court, and this Court has agreed, that LX.L. compels the 
trial court to enforce the terms and conditions of the Lease and prohibited the trial court from 
evaluating the equities. Pomodoro believes that LX.L. requires a review of equitable claims 
before there can be any strict enforcement of the provisions of any option to renew. 
If equity does not permit Pomodoro to renew the lease, Pomodoro will suffer 
undue and severe hardship. Pomodoro incurred significant expense when it made capital 
improvements to the leasehold premises which were otherwise not required of Pomodoro under 
the Lease. Pomodoro did so based upon Hillside's understanding, communicated to Hillside's 
agent, Mr. Johnson, that Pomodoro would renew the lease and that Pomodoro would be able to 
benefit from the capital improvements over the extended term. Coupled with Pomodoro's 
continuing investment and good will inextricably related to Pomodoro's operation of its business 
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from the leasehold premises, to deny Pomodoro the ability to renew the Lease under the special 
circumstances of this matter would accomplish a clear inequity and an unconscionable result. 
C. The Geisdorf ruling ratified The I.X.L. requirement that equitable facts be 
considered. 
While the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Geisdorf v. Doughty. 345 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16(6/19/98) reinforced the strict constructionist elements ofl.X.L.. it underscored and 
clearly emphasized the trial court's obligation to consider and examine the equities. In particular, 
Geisdorf declared that "under the totality of the circumstances" there may be "instances in which 
deviation from strict compliance may be equitable excused." p.7 The trial court has yet to 
undertake any review of the circumstances which would justify the application of equity in this 
matter, let alone to make any findings with respect thereto. Clearly, the facts which predicate 
Pomodoro's equitable claims are disputed by Hillside and Pomodoro is entitled to a review of 
these facts by the trial court before any judgment can be appropriately entered. 
D. The lease renewal provision should not be strictly enforced because 
Pomodoro did not believe that a written exercise was required. 
Although Geisdorf supports the fundamental premise that there should be strict 
compliance with option provisions, such as the renewal provisions of the Lease, it clearly excuses 
such strict compliance "when the optionee's conduct in failing to comply was not due to willful or 
gross negligence on the part of the optionee but was rather the result of an honest and justifiable 
mistake. . . ." Geisdorf supra at p. 7. citing Cattle Feedings. Inc. v. Jordan. 549 S.W. 2d 29 
(Tex. App. 1977). 
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Representatives of Pomodoro met with Mr. Johnson, as Hillside's representative, 
in April, 1997. The specific purpose of the meeting was to discuss the need for certain capital 
improvements to the leasehold premises and the relative responsibilities for the installation 
thereof. Pomodoro advised Hillside that, if Pomodoro were to construct the required 
improvements at its cost, Pomodoro would be thereby expressing its intention to renew the Lease. 
Thereafter, Pomodoro expended approximately $50,000.00 on capital improvements to the 
leasehold premises. None of these costs were necessary for the short term occupation of the 
premises by Pomodoro, but were constructed so that Pomodoro could benefit therefrom over the 
extended term. 
Based upon the prior discussion with Mr. Johnson, and the statement to Mr. 
Johnson that Pomodoro's undertaking of the improvements would mean that Pomodoro would be 
renewing the lease, Pomodoro did not believe that any further written notice was required or 
necessary. By virtue of Mr. Johnson's letter dated September 3, 1997, Pomodoro was specifically 
advised that Hillside expected a written notice of Pomodoro's intention to renew the Lease. 
Accordingly, Pomodoro immediately complied with Hillside's demands by letter dated September 
8, 1997. Pomodoro's failure to have delivered a written notice of exercise prior to September 2, 
1997, was the result of Pomodoro's honest and sincere belief that all acts necessary to exercise 
the renewal terms had been accomplished. No further thought was given to the matter until Mr. 
Johnson's letter of September 3, 1997. 
11 
E. Hillside waived any requirement that lease renewal be evidenced by any 
writing. 
It is well understood that the necessary elements of waiver include: (1) an existing 
right; (2) knowledge of the existence of that right; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right. 
Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993). The Soter's ruling was 
reviewed and clarified by the Geisdorf decision. However, as applied to this case, the doctrine of 
waiver is not only available, but the trial court is obligated to review all relevant facts bearing on 
the issue of waiver before making its decision. 
Clearly, the Lease described a renewal procedure which required a written notice 
of exercise, and Hillside was fully aware of this provision. Pomodoro submits that it is equally 
clear that Hillside knew that Pomodoro would be exercising the renewal option if it undertook to 
construct the capital improvements to the leasehold premises. Once the improvements had begun 
and were completed, all without objection or comment by Hillside, Hillside could be deemed to 
have waived its rights to receive a written notice of the option to renew the Lease. At the least, 
Pomodoro should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing by the trial court with regard to the waiver 
issue. Unlike the Geisdorf case, the trial court has not had the opportunity to receive a full 
expression of the facts, and the facts in this case are critical to a full understanding of Pomodoro's 
waiver claim as well as the application of any other equitable principle. As stated in Living 
Scriptures. Inc. v. Kudlik. 890 P.2d 7 (Utah App. 1995). 
The net effect is that the doctrine of waiver is a 'highly fact-dependent 
question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case 
because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law 
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through a course of such decisions' Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson. 
886 P.2d, 61 (Utah App. 1994) State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
Thus, we now grant very broad discretion to the trial court's application of 
legal propositions to the facts in waiver cases Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. 
Thus, the waiver issue in this matter should be initially referred to the trial court 
for a review and decision. Certainly, the doctrine as restated in Geisdorf should be applied, but 
the trial court should have the benefit of an evidentiary hearing and the ability to weigh all relevant 
facts before entering any ruling. Neither the trial court nor this appellate court should be deemed 
to be properly exercising its discretion if the waiver question were to be decided based upon the 
modest record thus far developed. Pomodoro is entitled to an opportunity to fully present the 
relevant facts. 
m . THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES ESTABLISHED A COURSE OF DEALING 
WHICH MODIFIED OR AMENDED THE LEASE TO ELIMINATE ANY 
REQUIREMENT THAT THE RENEWAL OPTION BE EXERCISED IN 
WRITING. 
It is well settled that parties to a contract have a right to rely upon the manner in 
which the parties have transacted with one another in determining a particular course of conduct. 
. . . To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a 
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
the justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions and 
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the 
contract language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the 
parties, (emphasis added) St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.T 
811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
Pomodoro has plead, and would intend to demonstrate at trial, that, in the course 
of dealing between Pomodoro and Hillside, Pomodoro had a reasonable expectation that the 
written notice requirement of the renewal provisions of the Lease would not be enforced. Hillside 
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had not required strict compliance with other provisions of the Lease and Pomodoro had verbally 
informed Hillside of its intentions with regard to the lease renewal provisions. Accordingly, 
Pomodoro reasonably assumed that the written notice requirement of the Lease would be waived 
by virtue of the manner in which Hillside had acted in response to other matters under the Lease 
and in light of Hillside's knowledge that Pomodoro would only construct the capital 
improvements if it were to exercise its option to renew and be a tenant for the extended term. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court granted summary judgment against Pomodoro because the trial 
court believed that Pomodoro was required to strictly comply with the renewal provisions of the 
Lease, and that no equitable arguments were relevant. Pomodoro submits that the trial court, in 
reaching this decision, misinterpreted the holding of the LX.L. case. Pomodoro's contentions are 
buttressed by the recent Geisdorf ruling which clearly requires the trial court to evaluate any 
asserted principles of equity before reaching a judgment. On this basis alone, Pomodoro is 
entitled to a remand. 
Further, Pomodoro has a right to have a review of those facts which Pomodoro 
believes support the application of the doctrine of waiver. Such facts should be presented in a 
trial proceeding, rather than be limited to affidavits. Additionally, at trial, Pomodoro should be 
entitled to present its argument regarding the course of dealing between the parties. 
Pomodoro submits that the trial courts Summary Judgment should be reversed and 
this case should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED the ^U day of December, 1998. 
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